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PLEA OF INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL 
CASES: AN UPDATE 
SAYEED AKHTAR, TUSHAR JAGAWAT 
Mc'Naughten Rule is die commonest formulation for plea of insanity in most countries. Althougjk 
assessment of the mental state at the time of offence is difficult, few instruments have been devised for 
this purpose. In the USA., efforts are being made to abolish the insanity defense and in the United 
Kingdom, amendments in the provisions of insanity defense have been proposed. The authors have 
stressed the need for some changes in the relevant sections of Indian Penal Code to increase the 
credibility of Psychiatric testimony in such cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plea of insanity is used as a defense in criminal 
cases and when successful the accused is acquitted 
of the charge on the ground of insanity. The term 
'insanity' is not a medical term but a legal concept 
meaning that degree of mental disorder that relieves 
toe offender of the criminal responsibility for his 
action. In the Western countries, it is estimated that 
plea of insanity is used as a defense in 1-2% of the 
criminal cases (Pasewik & Craig, 1980). 
Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGBRI) 
defendants tend to be older, married and un-
employed at the time of commission of the crime. 
Most of them have a prior psychiatric treatment 
history and there is a history of drug and alcohol 
abuse (Roger, 1987). Acquitees differed from those 
convicted, in being female (Roger, 1984), older and 
more educated, and more likely to be schizophrenic 
(Somasundaram, 1960 & 1974; Benezech et aL 
1984). Li a study of 187 men found NGBRI (Taylor 
& London, 1982), 34% of the defendants using the 
insanity plea were patients with Bipolar Affective 
Disorder. A high concordance rate (88%) was found 
between psychiatric evaluation of insanity and the 
verdict of the court. It reflects the influence of the 
psychiatrist's recommendations in the court's 
decision of insanity plea. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The defence of insanity has been recognized in 
English courts for over 700 years beginning from the 
reign of Edward HI in the fourteenth century, when 
complete madness was considered as a defense to a 
criminal charge (Simon, 1967). By 1518, it was well 
established that the lack of guilty mind and intellect 
meant a lack of criminal responsibility. Some 250 
years ago an English judge, in the trial of Edward 
Arnold said, "in order to avail oneself of defense of 
insanity, a man must be totally deprived of under-
standing and memory that be is not to know what ix 
was doing, not more than an infant, brute or a wild 
beast (Simon, 1983). The "wild-beast" test along 
with determination of ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong remained the standard of judging 
criminal responsibility until the year 1800 AD., 
when the landmark trial of Hadfield set a new stand-
ard (Whitlock, 1963). 
A former soldier. James Hadfield attempted as-
sassination of reigning English monarch, George m 
with the belief that be was the savior of mankind. He 
thought that in order to become popular he should 
sacrifice his life like Jesus Christ and for this he 
chose to carry out an act for which he would be 
hanged. The prosecution argued that the defendant's 
behavior (purchase of gunpowder, concealment of 
pistol etc.) clearly indicated that he was neither an 
idiot nor a madman, so "afflicted by absolute priva-
tion of reason". The jury acquitted him because he 
was insane at the time of commission of the crime. 
This decision was a landmark because it rejected 
two concepts previously held by the court. First, it is 
not necessary for acquittal on the ground of insanity 
that be must be completely deprived of his mental 
faculties; second, it severed the tie between insanity 
and ability to distinguish between right and wrong, 
MC'NAUGHTEN RULE 
Daniel Mc'Naughten was a Scottish woodcutter 
who assassinated Edward Drummond who was 
secretary to the Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, in 
the mistaken belief that Drummond was the Prime 
Minister. Mc'Naughten was described by nine 
medical witnesses as 'an extreme paranoiac en-
tangled in an elaborate system of delusions' and be 
believed, albeit falsely, that the Prime Minister was 
responsible for all his financial and personal misfor-
tunes. His trial, acquittal and reference to the House 
of Lords led to the formulation of a popular set of 
rules for criminal responsibility which have come to 
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be known as Mc'Naughten Rule (Modi, 1969). Ac-
cording to this rule, in order to establish innocence 
on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved 
that at the time of committing the crime the accused 
was laboring under such defect of reason from dis-
order of mind as to not to know the nature or quality 
of the act that he was doing, or that he did not know 
it was wrong and contrary to the law. 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND SCOTLAND 
The most important criticism of the Mc'-
Naughten Rule is that it rests on an entirely obsolete 
and misleading concept of nature of insanity. In-
sanity does not only or primarily affects the cogni-
tive or intellectual faculties but also affects the 
whole personality including both the will and emo-
tions (Marfatia, 1972). A person who developed 
hypoglycemia and committed assault on others, in 
one of the cases in Scotland (Camishe vs Boyle, 
1985), it was held that in absence of insanity he could 
not be acquitted on the ground that he lacked 'mens 
rea' owing to hypoglycemia (Blueglass, 1991). In 
another case, R vs Kemp, the accused made a mo-
tiveless attack on his wife. He was charged with the 
attempt to murder. Medical evidence showed that he 
had cerebral arteriosclerosis and suffered from tran-
sient lapse of consciousness. The judge commented 
that plea of insanity could not be established as it 
could not be proved that the brain had been affected 
in anyway (Hogan & Smith, 1978). 
The case of Suvillian vs Suvillian (1980) is a 
leading modem case on the defense of insanity. The 
defendant kicked the head of his friend while under-
going a seizure in post ictal stage. The medical 
evidence was that seizures are rarely associated with 
such type of behavior and the subjects may be un-
aware of what had happened. The ruling of the judge 
was that the defense open to him was insanity and 
he should plead guilty. Lord Dopock (Blueglass, 
1991) commented on this case "....it matters not 
whether the etiology of impairment was organic as 
in epilepsy, or functional or whether the impairment 
itself is permanent, transient or intermittent, 
provided that it subsisted at the time of commission 
of the act" 
It has been argued that the Mc'Naughten Rule 
must be replaced by more practical rules based on 
experience and therefore the Law Commission in the 
United Kingdom have prepared a draft bill which 
will replace the verdict NGBRI to "not guilty by 
evidence of mental disorder" (Law Commission, 
1985) and this verdict will be given if it is proved 
that at the time of comm ission of the act, the accused, 
on the balance of probabilities, was suffering from a 
mental disorder. An act in the state of automatism 
by reason of mental disorder or combined effect of 
mental disorder and intoxication will be brought 
under the purview if this verdict. If the reform is 
passed, a defendant like Suvillian will no longer be 
required to plead guilty. 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE U.SJV. 
Mc'Naughten Rule became the prevailing rule in 
the U.S.A., even though the formulation was 
criticized. Over the past 150 years, different legal 
formulations have been adopted by different states 
of the U.S.A., eg. "Irresistible Impulse Test" and 
Durham's formulation of "product of mental ill-
ness". The irresistible impulse test excuses the ac-
cused if it is proved that he had a mental condition 
that prevented him from exercising control over his 
conduct even though he could intellectually under-
stand the difference between right and wrong. The 
Durham's decision acquits the accused if it is shown 
that the act was the product of mental illness. If it is 
so, sociopathy and other personality disorders may 
be considered' product of mental illness' and the law 
assumes that such a disorder may impair behavior 
control. But this view is not generally held by 
psychiatrists who believe that persons with antiso-
cial personality should be held responsible for their 
behavior. 
The alternative formulation for insanity defense 
is the ALI (American Law Institute) Test: "A person 
is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time 
of such a conduct as a result of mental disorder or 
defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or con-
form his conduct to the requirement of law". The 
essential improvement over the Mc'Naughten Rule 
is the use of the word 'appreciate' rather than' know' 
to include the emotional and intellectual capacities 
for a 'conforming conduct' to the requirement of law 
(Boomrang, 1979). 
New reforms are taking place in different states 
of the U.S.A. after the public outcry over the release 
of Hinckley Jr., who had tried to assassinate Presi-
dent Reagan. Public opinion is building to remove 
the plea of insanity altogether, although Montana 
and Idaho states have abolished the insanity defense 
much earlier (Amelia, 1982). It however does not 
mean that the insanity defense has been completely 
done away with. The defense open is 'mens rea* that 
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relies on traditional psychiatric testimony, but al-
lows for only limited defense and it is argued that 
the 'mens rea' is still an insanity defense (Steadman 
et al, 1989), although the number of insanity acquit-
tals have diminished substantially following 
'abolition' of insanity defense. 
THE SCENARIO IN INDIA 
The law relating to insanity is laid down in the 
Indian Penal Code (IPC), which in substance is the 
same as Mc'Naughten Rule. Section 84 of IPC 
states, "Nothing is an offence which is done by a 
person who at the time of doing it, by reason of 
unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the 
nature of the act that he was doing or that it was 
wrong or contrary to the law (Saxena, 1992). 
The object of the legal test, as distinguished from 
the medical test, is to determine the criminality of 
the act to ascertain how far 'guilty intent and 
knowledge' can be attributed to a person of unsound 
mind. It is necessary for application of section 84 of 
IPC to show that (1) the accused was of unsound 
mind (2) he was of unsound mind at the time of the 
commission of the act, not before or after and, (3) 
he, by reason of insanity, was incapable of knowing 
the act and that what he was doing was wrong and 
contrary to the law. It is not sufficient to prove 
merely the presence of mental derangement or 
psychotic illness. The accused must prove that his 
cognitive faculties were so impaired that he was 
deprived of understanding the nature of the act or 
distinguish right from wrong; 'Wrong' here means 
moral and not legal wrong (Kherajmal vs State, 
1955). Besides, the state of mind should be proved 
at the time of commission of the act, not before or 
after, although to arrive to this conclusion, certain 
corroborative evidence such as absence of malice, 
after-thought, application of excessive violence, im-
pulsivity, lack of meticulous planning, lack of guilt, 
insight andjudgement (Rath & Dash, 1990) may be 
helpful (Shivraj Singh vs State of Madhya Pradesh, 
1959). Other characteristics of homicide committed 
by the insane are want of secrecy, lack of conceal-
ment, want of accomplices, indifference to the crime 
and multiple murders (Verma & Jha, 1966). 
ASSESSMENT OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The assessment of criminal responsibility is 
replete with difficulties, particularly in the 
retrospective evaluation of the criminal defendant 
on any specific insanity standard. As yet there is no 
instrument that can precisely determine the mental 
condition of the accused at the time of commission 
of the crime. It has to inferred from the evidence of 
persons who happened to observe the behavior and 
conduct of the accused prior to, during and after the 
commission of the offence and on the basis of avail-
able medical evidences (Globogin et al, 1984). 
Efforts have been made in this direction by devis-
ing two clinical instruments, Mental State at the 
Time of Offence Screening Evaluation (MSE), 
(Rogers, 1987); and Roger's Criminal Respon-
sibility Assessment Scale (R-CARS). MSE has three 
components, history of mental disorder, psychologi-
cal impairment at the time of crime and current 
mental state. MSE demonstrated high agreement 
where the criminal responsibility was not an issue 
(97%) but was much less accurate (50%) where 
insanity was raised as defence (Roger, 1987). R-
CARS evolved from a simple likert like scale. It 
consists of 30 individual assessment criteria and 
responses to these criteria are investigated through 
the use of three decision model: Mc'Naughten Rule, 
ALI and NGBRI. Independent clinicians utilizing 
R-CARS showed nearly prefect (97% concordance 
rate and Kappa co-efficient = 0.58) agreement 
(Rogers et al, 1984). R-CARS can discriminate in-
termediate range of impairment from GBMI stand-
ard and can distinguish the sane from the insane 
according to Mc'Naughten Rule. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OUR 
COUNTRY 
In our country, serious controversy in this field 
does not occur and psychiatry and law co-exist with 
mutual trust and understanding (Somasundaram, 
1992). The only insanity defense open is the Mc'-
Naughten Rule incorporated in the Indian Penal 
Code. The number of psychiatrists giving testimony 
in such cases is very small and insanity is often 
inferred from the evidence given by lay persons 
(Somasundaram, 1960). In our opinion, psychiatry 
in India has developed at par with that of the 
developed countries; it is high time that it must be 
made obligatory to have independent psychiatric 
testimony in all cases like multiple murders, infan-
ticides, crime committed by an epileptic, apparently 
motiveless murders, and crime committed during 
puerperium. (Somasundaram, 1960). 
The experience of the United Kingdom or the 
USA should be kept in mind while formulating 
insanity tests for this country. We cannot and should 
not do away with the insanity defense altogether. 
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There seem to be two compelling reasons: first, 
criminal culpability requires the presence of 'mens 
rea', or the intent to commit a criminal act; in-
dividuals who lack this capacity of 'free will* can 
not form a criminal intent. Second, the*purpose of 
the criminal justice system is not served by punish-
ing those who do not have the capacity of making a 
free rational choice (Tarceredi et al, 1977). There is, 
however, an urgent need to modify the insanity 
defence so that the testimony of the psychiatrist may 
become an important ingredient for our criminal 
justice system. 
A formulation like 'irresistible impulse' has 
practical difficulties and the dividing line between 
the irresistible impulse and the impulse not resisted 
is very thin. Durhams's Rule of 'product of mental 
illness' will also not be acceptable to us, which may 
even excuse a crime committed by a person with 
antisocial personality disorder. For at least heuristic 
reasons, they must be responsible for their act (In-
sanity Defense Workgroup, 1983). The formulation 
proposed by Bonnie (1983) and modified for our 
purpose is amply suited for our country which states 
that, "A person may not be guilty by reason of 
insanity if it is proved on the balance of probabilities 
that as a result of mental disease and mental retarda-
tion, he was unable to .appreciate the wrongfulness 
of the act at the time of offence"; it must be clarified 
that "mental disease should be only those mental 
conditions that grossly and demonstratively impair 
a person's perception and reality contact and it could 
not be attributed to voluntary ingestion of alcohol or 
other intoxicant". Such a formulation will be helpful 
for psychiatrists to give a conclusive opinion and 
their testimony will be more respectable. It must be 
very clear that the opinion of a psychiatrist is only 
viewed as advisory by the court and as a statement 
of probabilities and not factual truth. Nonetheless, 
psychiatric testimony will command more 
credibility and will have a potent influence on the 
justice system. 
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